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ABSTRACT 
This comment discusses Hans Lindahl’s central idea of a-legality. It begins by positioning the 
idea of a-legality in the literature on the constituent power of the people, showing how it ad-
vances the discussion at hand. Having done that, it raises two questions regarding the conceptu-
al and normative significance of the politics of a-legality. Is a-legality contingent on a certain 
form of consciousness, or a certain form of government? And, what is the basis of the normative 
recommendation that legal collectives ought to respond to a-legality with collective self-
restraint? The aim of both questions is to identify what bounds Lindahl’s idea of a-legality.  
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1. Introduction 
Today many political conflicts revolve around boundaries. Globalization, secession 
and migration have shifted the political attention from the constituted to the con-
stituent power of the people. At issue is nothing less than the appropriate basis of 
collective self-government: Who ought to belong to “we, the people”? In these de-
bates, the prerogative of the state to decide matters of inclusion and exclusion typ-
ically stands against the normativity of a boundless cosmopolitan law. Still, the 
fact that neither statism nor cosmopolitanism can put a stop to the petitio principii 
of modern constitutional law—one can always ask who authorizes these positions 
in turn—raises the suspicion that legal theory is at a loss when confronted with 
some of the most pressing political conflicts of our time. It abandons politics at the 
moment when it is needed the most. 
In Fault Lines of Globalization: Legal Order and the Politics of A-Legality, Hans 
Lindahl sets out to prove the opposite. He makes two central moves, and together 
they serve to open up the boundaries of legal collectives to systematic and norma-
tive thinking. The first move is to separate law from statehood, and thereby to 
show that the distinction between domestic and foreign politics associated with the 
modern state system is contingent on a more general theory of legal inclusion and 
exclusion. The second move is to separate law from moments of a-legality, by 
which is meant “strange behavior and situations that, evoking another realm of 
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practical possibilities, question the boundaries of (il)legality.”(p. 3) What results is 
a powerful argument against the political reductionism of our time. The central 
message of the book is that the state does not have the final word on matters of 
inclusion and exclusion, and justice is not as boundless as cosmopolitans would 
have it. The fact is that “[a]ny legal order we could imagine must have bounda-
ries” (p. 3), and the task is therefore to understand how they do their work of in-
cluding and excluding, and thereby also of constructing and challenging what 
counts as right, just and reasonable in a given historical situation. 
The originality and depth of this book makes it impossible for me to do justice 
to it in a short commentary. I will therefore concentrate on one topic, and that will 
be the significance of the politics of a-legality. According to Lindahl, every legal 
collective harbors “a normative blind spot which it can neither suspend nor entire-
ly justify”, and it is by responding to such moments of strangeness that legal col-
lectives receive their unique and defining characteristics (p. 7). In what follows, I 
am interested in the conceptual and normative significance of this argument. A-
legality is not a universal phenomenon. It is a concept situated within “the broader 
historical horizon of Western modernity” (p. 97), and this raises the question of 
what that historical horizon actually entails. Is the concept of a-legality contin-
gent on a certain form of consciousness, or a certain form of government? Fur-
thermore, the politics of a-legality is not merely an analytical figure. It also entails 
a normative recommendation, namely that legal collectives respond to the 
strangeness of a-legality with “collective self-restraint” (p. 249). But granted that 
a-legality cannot be subsumed under a legal code, one is prompted to ask for the 
authorization behind this recommendation. On what basis can Lindahl conclude 
that collective self-restraint is the appropriate normative response to a-legality?  
Let me start out, however, by positioning the politics of a-legality in the litera-
ture on the constituent power of the people, and show how it advances the discus-
sion at hand. 
 
2. The politics of a-legality 
 
The constituent power of the people is a central, but neglected question of modern 
constitutional law (Kalyvas 2008; Honig 2009; Loughlin 2013). It is central since 
no modern theory of law can avoid it: the constituent power of the people is the 
ultimate source of all legitimate law. It is neglected since any attempt to account 
for its legitimacy typically falls prey to a petitio principii; it becomes entangled in 
the very political disputes that it seeks to resolve. For political theorists accus-
tomed to put their trust in reason as a way of resolving political conflicts, this peti-
tio principii points to a weakness of modern constitutional law. It compromises the 
idea of collective self-government as a self-authorized form of power. To pre-empt 
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this weakness, many political theorists draw a Maginot line between the constitu-
tion of the people, on the one hand, and the constitution of law, on the other 
(Näsström 2007). They argue that if the people cannot decide on its own constitu-
tion without falling prey to an infinite regress, it cannot be part of a normative 
theory of law. It must be determined by other factors, such as the contingent forc-
es of history.  
Hegel is probably among the first to draw this conclusion. To ask “who is to 
draw up the constitution”, he asserts, is “nonsensical”. It presupposes that “no 
constitution as yet exists” (Hegel 1991, p. 311). Habermas agrees. In his view, “one 
cannot explain in purely normative terms how the universe of those who come to-
gether to regulate their common life by means of positive law should be com-
posed.” The constitution of the people arises out of “the decision of the founding 
fathers to order their life together legitimately by means of positive law”, and it is 
the task of their descendants to “tap the system of rights ever more fully” 
(Habermas 1998, pp. 115, 218; 2001 pp. 772-776). In a similar vein, Neil Walker 
argues that “we can never warrant the democratic credentials of any decisive act, 
including a decisive act of institution (why these people using this process?), except 
in terms of an already constituted system that purports to specify both the people 
and the processes through which their collective will is represented” (Walker 2007, 
pp. 248-49). 
This is where the novelty of Lindahl’s approach emerges. The central point he 
makes is that the petitio principii of modern constitutional law does not signal a 
weak spot, but a blind spot. The difference is telling, for whereas the former indi-
cates a situation of failure, the latter indicates a situation of estrangement. It im-
plies that no legal collective can be fully transparent onto itself. Every legal collec-
tive “has a blind spot in the form of normative claims that resist integration into 
the circle of reciprocity and mutual recognition, yet which the collective cannot 
simply shrug off as specious” (p. 222). Lindahl addresses a number of intriguing 
examples to illustrate this point. One of them is the Landless Workers Movement 
in Brazil (MST). By occupying unused land to attain food security for poor and 
landless workers, this movement breaches existing property rights and therefore 
appears illegal from the perspective of Brazilian law. At the same time, the move-
ment deliberately seeks to challenge what counts as reasonable and just by refus-
ing to abide by the law that judges it.  
How is one to assess this case? Are the acts undertaken by the Landless Work-
ers Movement illegal, or a-legal? The fact is that we cannot tell without falling 
prey to a petitio principii, and this is precisely the point made by Lindahl. There is 
no self-evident answer to this question. Every response we give is bound to be po-
litical. To think that one could circumvent the regress by writing it off as a marker 
of relativism, defeatism or skepticism will not do: “To engage in such tactic is to 
collapse responsiveness into a politics of boundaries that neutralizes or assimilates 
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normative claims that definitely resist inclusion in the legal order they question.” 
(p. 239) Put differently, this tactic only becomes one response among others in the 
conflict on who “we, the people” of Brazil are. Such is the politics of a-legality: it 
engages us in a fault line of normativity that can neither be fully justified nor sus-
pended.  
What can one see or do with this understanding of law that one could not see 
or do before? Lindahl approaches law from a first person plural perspective. From 
this perspective, law does not exist in a realm extraneous to those who abide by it. 
Norms of inclusion and exclusion are a matter of collective self-identification and 
de-identification (p. 191ff). They are formed, sustained and disrupted through eve-
ryday human behavior, ranging from the most mundane events of going shopping 
and dining to the most dramatic and exceptional events, such as those associated 
with Anders Behring Breivik’s defense of the shootings at Utoya or the Canadian 
Supreme Court’s ruling in the case of Quebec’s claim for secession. The fact that 
law is a matter of collective self-identification and de-identification changes the 
direction of the normative discussion. It means that how legal collectives respond 
to moments of a-legality not only has the power to transform the meaning of law. 
It also reveals their innermost normative priorities. To borrow Hannah Arendt’s 
terms, it discloses “who” as opposed to “what“ they are (Arendt 1998, p. 179).  
I believe there are two important merits to this view. First of all, it tells us 
why we ought to be “afraid of our fear” (Esposito 2010, p. 21). Hobbes writes in 
his autobiography that his mother was so afraid of the Spanish inquisition that she 
gave birth to twins—himself and fear—and one way to respond to moments of a-
legality is certainly with fear. A-legality calls our attention to strange acts and sit-
uations that are not yet codified in law, and such acts can be frightening. Indeed, 
they can be more frightening than the most hideous criminal act for the simple 
reason that in the latter case we at least know how to respond. When someone oc-
cupies unused land with the motivation that existing norms of property rights are 
illegitimate, or when a group of people walks into a food store to buy groceries and 
leaves it without paying under the motto that they belong to the precariat (p. 31) 
it creates estrangement. Who are these people, and why are they behaving as they 
do? The trouble is that while fear is a common response to such moments of a-
legality, it produces “ontological security” by transforming a strange situation into 
a familiar one (Mitzen 2006). It criminalizes abnormal behavior, and thereby fore-
closes the normative possibilities that such behavior may open up in the realm of 
politics and law.  
Second, a-legality challenges the distinction between domestic and foreign pol-
itics. As Lindahl puts it, “a strange place need not be foreign; conversely, foreign 
places need not be strange” (p. 42). This insight is perhaps the most important les-
son conveyed by the politics of a-legality. It serves to remind us that the distinc-
tion between domestic and foreign politics is contingent on the existence of a legal 
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collective taken in first person plural perspective. Today a number of democratic 
countries are in the midst of establishing new institutions and administrative pro-
cedures by which to cope with migrants and refugees seeking to create a new life 
for themselves and their families. These institutions and procedures often adopt 
measures that most legal collectives would deem unacceptable in domestic politics, 
such as arbitrary searching, racial profiling and long term detention. The critical 
point conveyed by Lindahl’s approach is that these measures already are domesti-
cated. The distinction between us and them is something that “we” make, and how 
a legal collective responds to the needs of migrants and refugees is therefore an in-
tegral part of its own collective self-understanding. It discloses who they are.  
A similar point has been made by Foucault and Arendt in relation to the prac-
tice of colonialism. As they argue, European countries did not go unaffected by the 
foreign policies undertaken in the epoch of colonization. What these countries did 
abroad was part of their own collective self-understanding, which is why the rac-
ism exercised in the colonies did not stay there. It was also brought back home: 
It should never be forgotten that while colonization, with its techniques 
and its political and juridical weapons, obviously transported European mod-
els to other continents, it also had a considerable boomerang effect on the 
mechanisms of power in the West, and on the apparatuses, institutions and 
techniques of power. A whole series of colonial models was brought back to the 
West, and the result was that the West could practice something resembling 
colonization, or an internal colonialism, on itself. (Foucault 2003, p. 103. See 
also Arendt 2004, Part II) 
 
3. Probing the conceptual and normative significance of a-legality 
 
It should be clear by now that responding to a-legality is quite demanding. It re-
quires not only that we overcome our own fear, but that we adopt a reflexive 
stance vis-à-vis the claims of inclusion and exclusion carried out in our name. This 
immediately raises the question of what it takes to uphold the politics of a-legality. 
How does one prevent a legal collective from falling into an abyss of fear, and 
eventually succumbing to a politics reduced to that of friends and enemies?  
This brings me to the first and conceptual question that I would like to raise as 
a comment to the book, namely whether the concept of a-legality is contingent on 
a certain form of consciousness or a certain form of government. According to 
Lindahl, a-legality encompasses a moment of strangeness that disrupts the distinc-
tion between the legal and the illegal. In this capacity, it has the potential to 
change the meaning and direction of a legal order. Yet, this moment of strangeness 
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does not refer to alterity in Levinas’s sense of the term, which is a moment other-
wise than being (Levinas 1981). Lindahl is careful to point out that the concept of 
law that he develops in the book is historically situated. It is worked out from 
within the broader historical horizon of Western modernity (p. 97). As we saw 
above, this horizon brings with it a problematic baggage in the form of Euro-
centrism, and Lindahl is of course aware of this heritage. Still, he points out that 
although his work has its roots in modernity, “it also turns back on it to critically 
interrogate key aspects of the conceptual framework that has governed the modern 
conception of legal order.” (p. 97).  
The argument that a philosophical enquiry built on a-legality has the capacity 
to reflect upon and critically interrogate its own origins is compelling. The question 
though is how we are to understand the source of that reflexivity. Where does it 
come from? One possible reading would be to argue that such reflexivity is nur-
tured by a specific historical consciousness. The argument would be that in moder-
nity, individuals are bereft of pre-modern sources of authority. They can no longer 
rely on nature, God or tradition in the authorization of law. On the contrary, they 
have come to understand that society at bottom is a social construct, and that 
human beings in this way have the power to write their own history. At times, it 
seems as if this is what Lindahl has in mind when he speaks of a-legality. It is asso-
ciated with a human consciousness aware of “the contingency of contingency”, i.e. 
of the hiatus between question and response (pp. 258, 206ff). 
At the same time, this reading seems too general to grasp the specificity of a-
legality. A-legality does not refer to human consciousness in general. It refers to a 
human consciousness oriented towards a legal order, and not just any legal order, 
but one that acknowledges the role of the constituent power of the people in the 
authorization of law. After all, it is this idea of collective self-government—the 
demand that a people should be once the authors and the addresses of law—that 
gives rise to the petitio principii of modern constitutional law, and therefore opens 
up a legal collective to what is strange and other to itself. My interpretation, then, 
is that when Lindahl speaks of a moment of a-legality that can be neither fully jus-
tified nor suspended, he is not speaking of legal order per se. He is referring to a cer-
tain form of government in Montesquieu’s sense of the term, albeit one that Mon-
tesquieu himself never had the chance to reflect upon: namely a modern and para-
doxical form of democratic self-government. If this reading is correct, it means 
that while a-legality has the power to interrupt the boundaries of an existing legal 
order, it is not itself boundless. It epitomizes a distinctively democratic form of le-
gal order.  
The second question that I would like to raise is more straightforward, and it 
concerns Lindahl’s recommendation that legal collectivities ought to respond to a-
legality with collective self-restraint. According to Lindahl, a legal collective 
should “restrain itself from neutralizing or destroying the bearers of normative 
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claims which resist inclusion into the circle of legal reciprocity.” (p. 249) In con-
trast to Schmitt, who maintains that the decisions taken by a legal collective ulti-
mately is a matter of survival, Lindahl suggests that the normative task of a legal 
collective is to endure rather than overcome its finitude (p. 254). As he reformulates 
it, sovereign is the one who decides “to sustain rather than to destroy the strange 
as strange.” (p. 254) 
The normative recommendation suggested by Lindahl is not merely deeply 
sympathetic. It also has a realistic kernel to it. Fear can expand to the point where 
it takes over completely, and by welcoming and making room for what is strange 
this recommendation offers a much needed countermeasure to the fearful and 
alarmed response characteristic for the Hobbesian state. Still, sometimes we have 
good reason to fear what is strange. Indeed, one could imagine situations when it is 
rational not to endure collective finitude, but to destroy what comes to question 
the legal order. How do we tell when such a situation occurs? The tricky thing is 
that we cannot: “Boundary-setting is responsive in that it establishes retroactively 
whether and how behavior is a-legal in the very act of establishing what counts as 
legal and illegal behavior. “ (p. 205). Against this background, one is prompted to 
ask what authorizes Lindahl to conclude that collective self-restraint is the appro-
priate normative response to a-legality. Granted that a-legality only can be estab-
lished retroactively, what could be the basis of this claim?  
I am aware that the questions raised above may push the author a bit beyond 
the scope of his own enquiry. Still, it is my belief that the quality of a book should 
be judged by the wonder and curiosity it instils among its readers. In line with the 
Greek assumption that it is wonder that stands at the origin of thinking, this book 
not only offers analytical clarity on a question that for long has bewildered politi-
cal and legal theorists, namely how to make sense of the constituent power of the 
people; it does so in a way that retains our sense of wonder at the world we call our 
own.  
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